HAS anyone seen my race card? I have been looking for it everywhere, but just can’t find it. My biggest fear is that Julius Malema or Jimmy Manyi may have stolen it. They seem to have way too many race cards.
If yours has gone missing too, fellow race card-less darkie, perhaps we could organise a violent protest and toyi-toyi until these cats return our cards? If I do not get mine back soon, I will have to rely solely on competence to achieve my career goals. Heaven forbid! I was hoping to play my card to ensure promotion or to scare a white boss into resigning before I can get my friends in very high places to kick him out. Now I have to rethink my strategy. I am really annoyed that the race card system’s effectiveness is being undermined by Malema et al.
As my mom would have said, the abuse of the system puts jam in the mouths of critics of race-based policies. Just as a heartless conservative might selectively cite anecdotal examples of welfare abuse as proof that welfare breeds dependency, so too can opponents of race-based policies now use Malema et al’s abuse of the race card as a false basis to assert that we should move beyond race.
We should not move “beyond race”. We should rather move beyond fetishising nonracialism. Even though race is a social construct that has been moulded on a political template over the course of an accidental history of racism, it continues to be a determinant of one’s chances of successful living long after apartheid’s official death. It is therefore critical that we look out for non- violent forms of racism in both the corporate and public sectors. We will not deal these lingering racisms a death blow by remaining enthralled by nonracialism.
I wonder if proponents of nonracialism ever asked themselves: “Why is nonracialism important?” If they did, they would puzzle away for a while. Just because race is a dodgy biological notion does not mean we do not use the socially constructed version of the category in our daily interactions. Racialism is alive and well. Racism is also alive and well. The race card can be an effective tool for spotting and rooting out racism.
But when exactly can the race card be used legitimately? Well, when you have been a genuine victim of racism or when you have witnessed a racist act and want to expose the perpetrator.
Racism is the possession or display of ill-will towards another on the basis of their phenotypical features. There is no evidence that Eishkom’s Jacob Maroga received ill-treatment by Eishkom’s board on the basis of his gorgeous complexion. He received no ill- treatment, let alone racism. The same goes for Transnet’s Siyabonga Gama. These are case studies in the abuse of the race card for personal and political gain.
There are also rules and responsibilities that flow from the right to use the race card. One rule is that the race-card game — sorry Malema et al — is open to all South Africans. Just like sporting codes have now been deracialised, so too the game of race-card playing is open to folks from all communities, black or white, poor or rich.
There is a moral obligation to play the race card in circumstances where doing so is the only available form of expressing and fighting for one’s dignity. Bobby Godsell could have shown his own race card in the direction of the Black Management Forum and the ANC Youth League.
Unfortunately, like soccer, the race card game is not one that South African whites are good at. In fact, most do not realise they have race card rights also. The explanation has to do with guilt. Many white South Africans feel bound by the history of an immoral past to which their skin colour is connected. Assert your right to also play the race-card game, I say. If racists can come in all colours, why should race-card players come in one shade only?
A second rule is that you should not abuse the system. Take this analogy. A rule book with the title “ministerial handbook” allows you to buy luxury vehicles. Does this mean you are compelled to buy these cars? Nope.
The careful exercise of discretion by a public official is a mark of political virtue. Similarly, just because you have the race card in your back pocket (and ones you stole from unsuspecting others, who were grinding away more honestly than you ever do) does not mean you have to play it every other day.
Those who play the race-card game excessively look more tragic than someone wearing a Bafana Bafana shirt. Furthermore, the race-card system will collapse if these abuses continue unabated. This will make it difficult for genuine victims of racism (both black and white) to expose real racial discrimination for fear of being seen to “play the race card”.
So, Malema et al, please leave at least some of your race cards at home when you leave for press conferences in the morning. Please? This will help, not hinder, the fight against racism. Seriously, boss.
http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=87002
Friday, November 13, 2009
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
Citizen groups need to grow deeper roots among the poor
Eusebius McKaiser & Steven Friedman
CITIZENS’ organisations in SA may have more influence than they believe — but only if they think more strategically and try harder to represent people at the grassroots. This is the key finding of a study of civil society organisations undertaken by the Centre for the Study of Democracy at Rhodes University and the University of Johannesburg and funded by the Heinrich Böll Foundation.
The centre felt the study was needed as democracy is a system in which government is meant to serve citizens and respond to their needs. This is not possible unless citizens organise to tell government (and fellow citizens) what they want and need and campaign for their concerns to be acted on.
The ability of civil society organisations (CSOs) to influence law and policy is a crucial test of democracy’s health. Dramatic changes in the African National Congress’ (ANC’s) leadership at Polokwane altered the political climate and ensured CSOs were operating in a new environment. Opinion on what this means for organised citizens’ ability to influence the government, differs sharply.
For some, Polokwane was a setback for civil society, because it brought to power leaders more interested in strengthening the ANC’s hold on power than in listening to citizens. For others, it created new opportunities for citizen influence, either because the new leaders were more willing to listen than those they replaced or because the defeat of the previous leadership created a more open and fluid environment, which would be more open to citizen influence.
Civil society’s effectiveness relies largely on whether CSOs read the climate accurately. So we convened discussions among civil society activists to analyse the climate and suggest responses.
Our report analysed the discussions and suggested a way forward to ensure CSOs wield as much influence as possible on public debate and government decisions. We found CSOs, particularly those committed to human rights and social equity, largely pessimistic about life after Polokwane. Most felt the change in ANC leadership promoted a social conservatism that threatened key rights protected by the constitution. They complained of what they saw as increased pressure for loyalty to the government and ruling party, and argued government talk of a new willingness to listen was an illusion.
Interestingly, given minorities’ fears after Polokwane, probably the most optimistic participants were white Afrikaners, who felt new opportunities had opened for them. But among CSOs sharing the values that inspired the fight against apartheid, the mood was largely pessimistic.
This sense that the government is now more hostile to CSO campaigns for rights and equity is based on experience. There are legitimate fears for the future of some human rights gains enshrined in the constitution. Despite that, we believe current thinking among much of civil society ignores important opportunities for citizen influence.
Civil society seems to see as new the negative trends that have been with us for some time. CSOs have felt for years that the government only pretends to listen. They also seem to rely far too much on whether the government is well disposed to them. This prompts two strategic misreadings.
One is to ignore difference and fluidity within government. All participants agreed that there were significant differences within the new government leadership, yet this was not always seen as an opportunity. But this it surely is, as leaders who have not agreed where they want to go are likely to be more open to independent ideas. It also ignores the new government’s need to distinguish itself from the previous one, which shows itself in, for example, new attitudes to HIV/AIDS. This creates opportunities for citizen influence.
Another is a tendency to assume citizens’ organisations can influence events only if the government wants to listen to them. One reason may be that too many “progressive” CSOs wrongly have assumed former civil society colleagues now in government would be natural allies; this may have created an unwarranted dependence on the sympathy of the government.
But, as the experience of CSOs such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) shows, government sympathy is often a result, not a cause, of CSO influence; governments are more likely to listen to organisations because they have built strong support in society. This suggests CSOs should be paying far more attention to ways in which they can enhance their influence in society.
If they did, they may well find that a society in which grassroots citizens have been protesting for four years against unaccountable government, and in which their frustrations are shared by many more affluent citizens, is a climate in which opportunities for winning support — and getting the government to listen — may be far more favourable than they believe.
But this requires that CSOs pay far more attention to the key constraint on their influence, as identified by the report: their shallow roots among the poor.
While it is fashionable to complain about the declining influence of citizens’ organisations in SA, we find civil society remains diverse, vigorous and vocal — it engages regularly in public debate and wields real influence. While CSOs closest to the ANC, such as Cosatu, are most influential, the TAC has shown it is possible to remain independent of the ANC and still influence events.
But civil society is also shallow. It is the preserve of the better off and better connected as most citizens lack the resources and access to organisation to participate in CSOs. This ensures that CSOs purporting to speak for the poor often lack roots among those whose concerns they champion. This stunts their influence, and makes it harder for them to mobilise the citizen support needed to influence decisions.
The problem is not that CSOs ignore the poor: there are real obstacles to building democratic organisation at the grassroots of society. But, unless CSOs begin to find ways to help grassroots citizens enter the national debate by joining organisations that speak for citizens, civil society influence will be much weaker than it need be.
One other facet of current civil society thinking may need to change for CSOs to enable citizens to influence decisions that shape their lives. Citizen influence is impossible without democracy, and so the future of civil society influence depends on preserving democratic freedoms and institutions. All too often, CSOs are deeply concerned about the issue that motivates them, but not about the democracy that makes it possible for them to pursue these concerns.
Thus, attacks on grassroots social movements critical of the government — such as recent violence against Durban shack-dweller activists — are ignored by CSOs, despite the fact that they are a clear danger to citizen participation in decisions. Few CSOs are concerned enough about appointments to the judiciary and statutory human rights institutions or the vigour of Parliament, although all these issues determine whether CSOs can operate in the democratic environment they need if they are to be effective.
Just as citizen organisation is crucial to democracy, so too is democracy essential to citizen organisation. If CSOs ignore the need to defend and deepen democracy, the bleaker period some fear may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
n McKaiser is an associate of the Centre for the Study of Democracy. Prof Friedman, who led the research, is the centre’s director. The report mentioned in this article can be found at http://www.boell.org.za/.
http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=86545
CITIZENS’ organisations in SA may have more influence than they believe — but only if they think more strategically and try harder to represent people at the grassroots. This is the key finding of a study of civil society organisations undertaken by the Centre for the Study of Democracy at Rhodes University and the University of Johannesburg and funded by the Heinrich Böll Foundation.
The centre felt the study was needed as democracy is a system in which government is meant to serve citizens and respond to their needs. This is not possible unless citizens organise to tell government (and fellow citizens) what they want and need and campaign for their concerns to be acted on.
The ability of civil society organisations (CSOs) to influence law and policy is a crucial test of democracy’s health. Dramatic changes in the African National Congress’ (ANC’s) leadership at Polokwane altered the political climate and ensured CSOs were operating in a new environment. Opinion on what this means for organised citizens’ ability to influence the government, differs sharply.
For some, Polokwane was a setback for civil society, because it brought to power leaders more interested in strengthening the ANC’s hold on power than in listening to citizens. For others, it created new opportunities for citizen influence, either because the new leaders were more willing to listen than those they replaced or because the defeat of the previous leadership created a more open and fluid environment, which would be more open to citizen influence.
Civil society’s effectiveness relies largely on whether CSOs read the climate accurately. So we convened discussions among civil society activists to analyse the climate and suggest responses.
Our report analysed the discussions and suggested a way forward to ensure CSOs wield as much influence as possible on public debate and government decisions. We found CSOs, particularly those committed to human rights and social equity, largely pessimistic about life after Polokwane. Most felt the change in ANC leadership promoted a social conservatism that threatened key rights protected by the constitution. They complained of what they saw as increased pressure for loyalty to the government and ruling party, and argued government talk of a new willingness to listen was an illusion.
Interestingly, given minorities’ fears after Polokwane, probably the most optimistic participants were white Afrikaners, who felt new opportunities had opened for them. But among CSOs sharing the values that inspired the fight against apartheid, the mood was largely pessimistic.
This sense that the government is now more hostile to CSO campaigns for rights and equity is based on experience. There are legitimate fears for the future of some human rights gains enshrined in the constitution. Despite that, we believe current thinking among much of civil society ignores important opportunities for citizen influence.
Civil society seems to see as new the negative trends that have been with us for some time. CSOs have felt for years that the government only pretends to listen. They also seem to rely far too much on whether the government is well disposed to them. This prompts two strategic misreadings.
One is to ignore difference and fluidity within government. All participants agreed that there were significant differences within the new government leadership, yet this was not always seen as an opportunity. But this it surely is, as leaders who have not agreed where they want to go are likely to be more open to independent ideas. It also ignores the new government’s need to distinguish itself from the previous one, which shows itself in, for example, new attitudes to HIV/AIDS. This creates opportunities for citizen influence.
Another is a tendency to assume citizens’ organisations can influence events only if the government wants to listen to them. One reason may be that too many “progressive” CSOs wrongly have assumed former civil society colleagues now in government would be natural allies; this may have created an unwarranted dependence on the sympathy of the government.
But, as the experience of CSOs such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) shows, government sympathy is often a result, not a cause, of CSO influence; governments are more likely to listen to organisations because they have built strong support in society. This suggests CSOs should be paying far more attention to ways in which they can enhance their influence in society.
If they did, they may well find that a society in which grassroots citizens have been protesting for four years against unaccountable government, and in which their frustrations are shared by many more affluent citizens, is a climate in which opportunities for winning support — and getting the government to listen — may be far more favourable than they believe.
But this requires that CSOs pay far more attention to the key constraint on their influence, as identified by the report: their shallow roots among the poor.
While it is fashionable to complain about the declining influence of citizens’ organisations in SA, we find civil society remains diverse, vigorous and vocal — it engages regularly in public debate and wields real influence. While CSOs closest to the ANC, such as Cosatu, are most influential, the TAC has shown it is possible to remain independent of the ANC and still influence events.
But civil society is also shallow. It is the preserve of the better off and better connected as most citizens lack the resources and access to organisation to participate in CSOs. This ensures that CSOs purporting to speak for the poor often lack roots among those whose concerns they champion. This stunts their influence, and makes it harder for them to mobilise the citizen support needed to influence decisions.
The problem is not that CSOs ignore the poor: there are real obstacles to building democratic organisation at the grassroots of society. But, unless CSOs begin to find ways to help grassroots citizens enter the national debate by joining organisations that speak for citizens, civil society influence will be much weaker than it need be.
One other facet of current civil society thinking may need to change for CSOs to enable citizens to influence decisions that shape their lives. Citizen influence is impossible without democracy, and so the future of civil society influence depends on preserving democratic freedoms and institutions. All too often, CSOs are deeply concerned about the issue that motivates them, but not about the democracy that makes it possible for them to pursue these concerns.
Thus, attacks on grassroots social movements critical of the government — such as recent violence against Durban shack-dweller activists — are ignored by CSOs, despite the fact that they are a clear danger to citizen participation in decisions. Few CSOs are concerned enough about appointments to the judiciary and statutory human rights institutions or the vigour of Parliament, although all these issues determine whether CSOs can operate in the democratic environment they need if they are to be effective.
Just as citizen organisation is crucial to democracy, so too is democracy essential to citizen organisation. If CSOs ignore the need to defend and deepen democracy, the bleaker period some fear may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
n McKaiser is an associate of the Centre for the Study of Democracy. Prof Friedman, who led the research, is the centre’s director. The report mentioned in this article can be found at http://www.boell.org.za/.
http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=86545
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